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Abstract 
The U.S hog production industry has been continually subjected to rapid structural changes since the early 
1990s. The industry‟s move towards more concentrated large hog farms and geographical concentration of 
such farms, have triggered public concerns over the dangers such big animal feeding operations are likely 
to pose to the waters of the country. This study investigates the implications of state-level environmental 
regulations on the structure of hog farms.  The results of this study suggest that environmental regulations 
will result in one of three possible scenarios: (1) a more competitive industry in which small hog operations 
are not adversely affected which will allow more small operations to enter rather than exit the industry; (2) 
a more concentrated hog production industry in which large operations survive while small operations exit 
the industry; (3) no change in the structure of the industry where both sizes of operations are not 
significantly affected by environmental stringency.  
 




The U.S. hog industry, once dominated by small owner-operated crop-hog farms, has 
been the subject of significant changes in operation size, organizational structure, and 
technological base during the past decade (McBride and Key, 2003).  The industry is 
currently dominated by large specialized operations characterized by low costs, improved 
technologies in areas such as breeding, feeding and facilities management and a primary 
occupation in livestock production. High cost small operations have been vulnerable to 
declines in hog prices, especially in the 1990s, and are among the first to exit the industry 
when faced with such economic hardships, while low cost operations tend to survive, 
(McBride and Key, 2003). The U.S. hog production industry which had about 3million 
operations during the 1950s, only comprised of about 70 000 and 65000 hog farms in 
2004 and 2007, respectively. The top three hog producing states, Iowa, North Carolina, 
and Minnesota accounted for about 55% of the U.S. total hog inventories in 2007, 
reflecting significant structural changes in this industry over the years.  3 
 
The changes in animal production saw an expansion in concentrated animal 
feeding operations, and a rise in issues associated with large numbers of animals in 
confined areas, which include: water contamination; air pollution; health effects; concern 
about antibiotics; animal welfare; and loss of resources, Centner (2006).  To address 
these environmental issues, the federal government requires states with animal feeding 
operations (AFOs) to enforce environmental regulations such as waste management plans 
(WMPs), mandatory record keeping (MRK), odor abatement plans (OAPs), handling of 
dead swine (HDS), reports on waste spillage (RWS), nutrient management plans (NMPs), 
manure (dry and liquid) application setbacks (MAPs), cost share programs (CSPs) and 
AFO location setbacks (ALSB). Federal involvement in environmental regulations on 
AFOs began with the inception of the Clean Water Act of 1972.  
While federal regulations must be met nationwide, states with such large hog 
animal feeding operations (HFOs) are facing environmental pressure from people of all 
walks of life and have been continually adopting more stringent regulations as well as 
more regulations since the 1990s
1. In addition, to regulations required by the federal 
government, some states require: facility design approval (FDA); and construction and 
operation permits (COPs), zoning requirements, and hydrogen sulfide regulations. 
Since the majority of regulations on nonpoint pollution are set at the state level, 
hog producers have to deal with ever increasing manure management compliance costs 
(Metcalfe, 2000, 2001), as a result of the increased regulatory stringency. The question 
on how increases in environmental stringency affect the competitiveness of AFOs 
prompted several economists who wanted to understand: (1) how this increase in 
                                                 
1 A table showing the variation of environmental regulation stringency among the top ten hog producing 
states and the federal government is provided in appendix A. 4 
 
environmental stringency affect U.S. hog production, (2) how important the increase in 
compliance costs is to the competitiveness of AFOs, (3) how these costs affect the 
geographical concentration of hog farms in the U.S.  A number of studies have addressed 
environmental regulation issues affecting U.S. hog production.  These studies are 
discussed in section 2 of the paper.  
2. Literature Review 
Fleming, Babcock, and Wang (1998) investigated the cost of delivering manure nutrients 
from Iowa swine production. The study considered: two forms of manure storage 
(anaerobic lagoon and slurry basin); two target nutrients (nitrogen and phosphate); two 
crop rotations; and two levels of field incorporation (tillage of manure into soil). Results 
of the study suggest that manure nutrient returns are maximized when: high nutrient 
using crops are grown close to a medium sized swine facility that uses nutrient 
conserving methods to store manure; and that incorporating manure increases production 
returns while improving air quality. The study also found that: the value of manure 
nutrients (i.e. applied nutrients); tend to match crop requirements under a phosphate 
standard rather than under a nitrogen standard and that the profit maximizing number of 
hogs and profits are greater under a phosphate standard.  
Fleming (1999) estimated how much larger the setback length for surface 
application of manure must be relative to the setback length for soil incorporation to 
encourage incorporation in Kentucky. Results suggested that setback lengths do not 
encourage odor control through incorporation and that the setback length for surface 
application has to be substantially longer than that of incorporation. 5 
 
Sullivan, Vasavada and Smith (2000), identified three possible reasons for the 
variation  in  states‟  policies  regulating  nonpoint-source  pollution.  These  include;  the 
design of Federal water policy laws, characteristics of the nonpoint-source pollution, and 
characteristics of the states that have to deal with water quality issues.  
Metcalfe  (2000)  examined  the  change  in  state  legislation  imposed  to  regulate 
manure management and to protect water quality between 1994 and 1998. Based on the 
state to state variation of the regulation, the study constructs a stringency index which is 
dependent  on the number of legislations  imposed in  each state. Examination of state 
legislation  between  the  two  years  showed  that  the  stringency  of  state  manure 
management regulation significantly increased between 1994 and 1998. The study noted 
that a majority of the increases in regulation were imposed in response to the expansion 
of hog production.  
Metcalfe (2001) investigated the influence of water quality regulatory stringency 
on hog production in the U.S.  The author used a profit maximization model for hog 
production in which the environment was included as an input in the production process. 
Results show that there are significant environmental compliance costs for small hog 
feeding operations, and large operations did not appear to be influenced by the level of 
state environmental stringency.  
Gillespie and Fulton (2001), examined the movement of hog farms among three 
different size categories.  They found that the hog–corn price ratio has continued to affect 
the entry and exit of small hog farms. They also find the hog-corn price ratio to have 
influenced the movement of hog farms among size categories.   6 
 
Centner and Mullen (2002) analyzed enforcement mechanisms and opportunities 
for greater enforcement of AFO regulations and found that reductions in pollution could 
be a result of more effective enforcement of the existing regulations, and not from 
coming up with more regulations.  
Agapoff and Cattaneo (2003), addressed the effectiveness of environmental 
quality incentive program (EQIP) in helping farmers meet nitrogen and phosphorous 
based manure application standards. They found that EQIP helps cover the costs of most 
of the small farmers and some of the large farmers.  
McBride and Key (2003, 2004), found that the U.S. swine industry has been the 
subject of significant changes in size and ownership structure of operations during the 
past decade. They further argued that large operations are owned by farmers whose 
primary occupation is farming, and better technologies in areas such as breeding, feeding 
and facilities management. High cost operations have been vulnerable to declines in hog 
prices especially in the 1990s and are among the first to exit the industry when faced with 
such economic hardships, while low cost operations tend to survive.  
Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005) described the patterns of regional and 
national change in the geographical concentration of hog, dairy, and fed-cattle inventories 
for 48 states in the United States from 1975 to 2000. Results show evidence of all three 
sectors becoming more geographically concentrated within states across the country. 
Findings also show that Hog and dairy inventories increased in nontraditional production 
regions while fed-cattle inventories increased only in three major producing states. The 
northwestern region of the U.S. experienced reduced geographical concentration of 7 
 
livestock production while the western regions experienced both increased livestock 
production and increased geographical concentration.  
Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005) examined the factors affecting state 
annual share of national inventory for each of the hog, dairy, and fed-cattle sectors using 
data from the 48 contiguous states for 1976 to 2000. Results indicated that differences in 
environmental stringency facing livestock producers had a significant influence on 
production decisions in the dairy and mainly the hog sector. 
Kuo(2005) estimated the factors behind the exit behavior of small swine producers in 
the U.S swine industry for the period 1988 through 2003.  The author finds evidence 
against new large producers entrants displacing incumbent small producers ruling out the 
existence of any crowding-out effect between the two producer sizes. The study also 
finds evidence that the expanding larger producer hog operation sizes pressure the small 
producers to leave swine industry. Contrary to the findings by Metcalfe, 2001, and 
Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005), state specific environmental regulations were 
found to have no influence on why small producers are leaving the industry.  
Weersink and Raymond (2006) investigated the regional characteristics where 
livestock spills occur, whether the spills are generating complaints, the types of citizens 
who are complaining, and whether environmental policy deters either spills or 
complaints. Results indicated that the distance between livestock producers and both 
environmentally sensitive areas and people serves to reduce conflicts between farmers 
and the local community.  
While the foregoing studies are important in providing insights on the economic 
impact of environmental regulations on hog production, with the exception of Kuo 8 
 
(2005), they are all limited to short-run implications. The short-run and long-run impact 
of environmental regulations on the structure of U.S. hog farms remains theoretically and 
empirically unanswered. Understanding the impact of regulations on the distribution of 
hog production is an important question for policymakers. If environmental regulation 
affects the distribution across farms, it must be due to differential cost structures of large 
and small hog farms.
2 In this research, we answer the following question: What is the 
effect of environmental regulations on the structure of hog farms?  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the implications of state-level 
environmental regulations on the structure of hog farms. To address this question we 
develop a theoretical model that addresses supply shifts due to the increase in 
environmental regulation compliance costs in a perfectly competitive hog industry in 
both the short-run and the long-run. Addressing environmental regulations in the model 
as a supply shifter is not new in economics literature. Litchenberg, Parker and Zilberman 
(1988), and Sunding (1996), applied the same method to address environmental 
regulations on the use of pesticides in the agricultural indiustry. Litchenberg, Parker and 
Zilberman(1988) estimating marginal costs of environmental regulations on pesticides 
affecting agriculture, in the short-run. Sunding(1996) extended the work by Litchenberg, 
Parker and Zilberman(1988) by explicitly considering temporal as well as spatial 
diversity when measuring marginal welfare costs of non-uniform environmental 
regulations (i.e. pesticide application reduction requirement) affecting agriculture, in the 
short-run. Kartz and Rosen (1983) analyzed the effects of taxation as a cost shifter using 
the conjectural variations model of oligopoly. Hamilton and Sunding (1997) examined 
                                                 
2 Indeed the link between environmental and industry structure is the basis for  some suggestions to use 
environmental regulation to influence industry structure after  Initiative 300, the Nebraska Anti-Corporate 
Law, has been invalidated by the  courts.    9 
 
the effect of changing supply on the market structure of the downstream food processing 
sector allowing for cost differences and endogenous downstream entry and exit. The 
work by Hamilton and Sunding (1997) is the only work that utilizes this methodology to 
address long-run implications of supply shifts. The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows: section 3 presents the model, and section 4 summarizes and concludes the paper.   
 3. Economic Model 
We present a general profit maximization model for a perfectly competitive industry 
which will be used to analyze the impact of environmental regulations on HFOs both in 
the short-run and in the long-run. The model is an adaptation of the framework developed 
by Hamilton (1999) to an atomistic industry. Hamilton (1999)‟s framework addresses 
demand shifts in an oligopolistic industry. 
We assume a perfectly competitive industry consisting of N hog farms of two 
distinct sizes, sl N n n , with  0 s n and  0 l n  representing the number of small and 
large HFOs , respectively. Short and long-run impacts of environmental regulations will 
be analyzed. Costs of production for a single HFO of sizei, for , i s l , are given 
by ( ; ) i i i c c q E , where  i q is the level of hog output for a HFO of size i  and E 
represents environmental regulations imposed on HFOs. We introduce, E, as a cost 
shifter the same manner as in Katz and Rosen (1983), Litchenberg, Parker and 
Zilberman(1988), Sunding (1996)  and Hamilton and Sunding (1997) . The properties of 
the cost functions are: 
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E , the average cost function is a nondecreasing function of the 
levels of environmental regulations. 
Assuming that large HFOs are more efficient than small HFOs (Rhodes, 1995; Kuo, 
2005), due to economies of scale, we can write; 
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The above condition, states that the marginal cost of a small HFO is at least greater than 
that of a large HFO, in equilibrium. This condition was found to be empirically true by 
Rhodes (1995). Characteristics of efficient producers such as: quick access and adoption 
of new technology; easy access to market information and ease of its use; increased 
specialization; and easy or superior access to all inputs including capital are less likely to 
be associated with small producers (Rhodes, 1995). Fulton and Gillespie (1995) also 
argue that technological progress in the swine industry has lowered the cost of 
production. This technological progress is found to be associated with large operations as 
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, this condition states that the marginal 
expansion of output does not raise the marginal cost function of large HFOs by more than 
that of the small HFOs. This follows from the argument that larger operations are more 
efficient than small operations. The inverse derived demand function facing the hog 
production industry is given by ) (Q p p , where s s l l Q n q nq , is the total hog output 
produced by the hog production industry and p is the hog price.  The demand curve is 




The representative HFO of size,i ‟s objective is to 
max ( , )
i
i
i i i q pq c q E   (1) 
Differentiating equation (1) with respect to  i q and setting equal to zero yields the first-
order condition for a HFO of sizei , 
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The sufficient second order condition of the 
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3.1. Short-run implications of environmental regulations on hog farms 
In the short-run, the number of hog farms in each HFO size category is fixed. An HFO of 
size iearns a profit in the short-run, which in turn provides an incentive for other HFO‟s 12 
 
to enter the market. Entry of new HFOs is however not possible since HFOs cannot build 
new establishments in the short run. The short-run equilibrium is determined by industry 
demand and HFO supply functions. The supply function is determined by the first order 
condition for profit maximization, and demand is given by the inverse demand function, 
) (Q p p . To determine the short-run equilibrium, we totally differentiate first-order 
condition for each HFO of sizei  (2) and the inverse demand function. Presenting the 
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(4) be denoted by . The determinant of the coefficient matrix, ) det( , given by  
det( ) ( ') '
s l l
s l l
q q l s q mc mc n p n p mc  (5) ,  
is positive by the second order condition  0
i
qi mc  , the slope of the inverse demand 
function,  0 '
Q
p
p , and the number of HFOs in each subgroup,  0 i n .  
The effects of environmental regulations on the hog output of a representative small 
HFO, representative large HFO and the hog production industry are: 
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dE mc mc n p n p mc  (8) , respectively.  All the terms 
in the numerator of (6) are negative, henceforth, (6) is negative since the denominator is 
positive by (5), supporting the empirical findings by Metcalfe (2001). The first 
expression in the numerator of (7) is positive and the second expression is negative. The 
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,  suggesting that, increasing environmental regulations can 
either increase or decrease the output of a large HFO. The numerator of (8) is negative 
and the denominator is positive, suggesting that environmental regulations have the effect 
of reducing total hog production in the short-run.   





i . Differentiating this condition 












.  (9) Using (6), (7) and (8) and (9), the effects of 
environmental regulations on the share of marketing for small and large HFOs are given 
by: 
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(11) is positive and negative when, 
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l s , respectively. We cannot 
sign (10) and (11) implying that environmental regulations can either increase or decrease 
the share of hog marketing for both small and large HFOs.  
 
3.2. Long-run implications of environmental regulations on hog farms 
In the long-run, short-run profits or losses will induce HFOs to enter or exit the industry 
until profits are driven to zero. We assume that there are barriers to entry and exit for 
large HFOs so that only small HFOs enter and exit the industry. Small HFOs enter until 
profit is driven to zero in the industry. In equilibrium (market equilibrium) the number of 
small HFOs, 
*
s n  is determined by:  
0 ) , ( ) (
* * *
*
E q c q Q p s s s
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* * E q ac Q p s
s  (12), where, 
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s s l l Q n q n q is 
the total output of the hog production industry in the long run, and 
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E q ac , represents the average cost function for small HFOs. Equation 15 
 
(12) states that in equilibrium when firms are earning zero economic profits, price equals 
average cost.  
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elements are as defined earlier. 
Calculating the determinant of the coefficient matrix, , and using the definition of 
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The effect of environmental regulations on the hog output of a representative 
small HFO is: 














The sign of (15) depends on how the change in marginal costs for small HFOs due to 
environmental regulation compares to the change in the average costs for small HFOs 
due to environmental costs. The relative sizes of the changes in marginal and average 
costs due to environmental regulation mainly depend on the type of regulation. If the 
environmental regulation shifter affects fixed costs only, then it will have an effect on 16 
 
average costs and not marginal costs




E mc ac ), 
implying that environmental regulations have a positive effect on the output for small 
HFOs in the long-run. When environmental regulations shift the marginal cost curve 




E mc ac ), then (15) is negative and output will 
fall with an increase environmental regulations. However if the regulation affects variable 
costs (e.g. regulations that affect input price), then both marginal costs and average costs 
will change. The direction of change will be positive (negative) when the change in 
average costs due to the regulation is greater (lower) than its effect on marginal costs. 
Examples of such regulations include; nutrient management, and mandatory record 
keeping, which are all similar to an increase in an input price
4. When the regulations are 
aggregated, the direction of the effect will depend on how the aggregated regulations 
affect average costs, technology and/or whether they behave like an increase in input 
price. In the wake of all such possibilities, we cannot readily tell the sign.  
The effect of environmental regulations on the hog output of large HFOs is given 
by: 
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3 Examples of regulations that affect average costs only are: facility design, operation and construction 
requirements, setback requirements (e.g. HFOs may be forced to relocate their operations to conform to the 
requirement), are all onetime costs.  
4 A nutrient management regulation may require a change in the hog diet which will have an effect on the 
price of feed if certain nutrients need to be added or eliminated. Also, mandatory record keeping can be 
viewed as a variable cost as this involves daily monitoring of the hogs. If one has to take a census of hogs 
weekly or every other week, then the cost of monitoring is an ongoing cost. 17 
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following the efficiency assumption we made earlier, that is, large HFOs are assumed to 
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positive or negative depending on how the change in average costs due to environmental 
regulations compares to the change in marginal costs due to environmental regulations as 
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The effect of environmental regulations on the number of small HFOs is given by: 
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The denominator of (17) is negative by (14). The first term in the numerator of (17) is 
negative by   0 '
s




E mc mc , as established earlier.  The second term 18 
 








E mc ac ). This basically depends on the type 
of environmental regulation as explained earlier. The third term is 
positive(negative)when the change in marginal costs for large HFOs due to 
environmental regulations is lower(greater) than the change in the average costs for small 
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s s ). In other words, the fourth term is positive 
(negative) when the ratio of the change in the average costs for small HFOs (due to 
environmental regulations) to the change in marginal costs for small HFOs (due to 
environmental regulations) is greater (lower) than the ratio of the increase in average 
costs for small HFOs due to an increase in output to increase in marginal costs due to an 
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When the numerator of (17) is positive (negative) an increase in environmental 
stringency has the effect of reducing (increasing) the number of small HFOs.  
  In order to determine the effect of environmental regulations on the industry 
output, we differentiate the equilibrium industry output condition, 
* * * *
s s l l Q n q n q ,  with 
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environmental regulations on industry output is given by:  
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The sign of the denominator is negative from (14). The first term in the numerator is 
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s . In other words, the 
second term is positive (negative) if the ratio of the rise of marginal costs of small HFOs 
(due to a marginal expansion of output) to the rise in average costs of small HFOs (due to 
a marginal expansion of output) is greater (smaller) than the ratio of the change in 
marginal cost of small HFOs (i.e. due to environmental regulations) to the change of 
average costs of small HFOs (i.e. due to environmental regulations). The overall sign of 












































s .    
Using (9),(15), (16) and (18) ,the effect of environmental regulations on the share of hog 
marketing for a representative small HFO is: 20 
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The denominator of (19) is negative from (14) and 0
2 Q . To sign the first term in the 
numerator of (19) we analyze its components as follows:  the first component of the first 
term is negative, 0 ) ' ' ' (
2 2 2 p q n n p q n mc Qp s l s s l
l
ql ; and the second component of the 




E mc ac , can be positive or negative as discussed earlier. The first term in 








E mc ac ). The second 
term is negative (positive) if the ratio of the rise of marginal costs of small HFOs (due to 
a marginal expansion of output) to the rise in average costs of small HFOs (due to a 
marginal expansion of output) is smaller (greater) than the ratio of the change in marginal 
cost of small HFOs (i.e. due to environmental regulations) to the change of average costs 
of small HFOs (i.e. due to environmental regulations).  


















 implying that 
environmental regulations have the effect of raising the share of hog marketing for small 


















, implying that 
environmental regulations have the effect of reducing the share of hog marketing for 
small HFOs. 
The effect of environmental regulations on the share of hog marketing for 
representative large HFO is: 21 
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The denominator in (20) is negative by (14) and  0
2 Q . The first term in the numerator, 
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. This implies that environmental regulations have the effect of increasing 
the share of hog marketing for large HFOs. The sign of (20) is positive when the 
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. This implies that environmental 
regulations have the effect of reducing the share of hog marketing for large HFOs.  22 
 
4. Summary and conclusions 
We have shown how the output for each size of HFO, the number of HFOs , the 
industry output and the share of marketing for each HFO size change with environmental 
stringency both in the short-run and long-run. Results in the short-run are mainly driven 
by changes in marginal costs due to environmental regulations, while long-run results are 
driven by both changes in marginal and average costs due to environmental regulations. 
In the short-run, only environmental regulations that affect variable costs are captured, 
whereas, in the long-run, environmental regulations that affect fixed costs are also 
captured. The short-run analysis provides a benchmark case in this study.  
In the short-run, the effect of environmental regulations on the output for a 
representative small HFO is to reduce output. This follows the empirical results in 
Metcalfe (2001) and Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005). 
While our theoretical result on the effect of environmental regulations on the 
output of large HFOs is inconclusive empirical evidence by Metcalfe (2001), Kuo, 2005 
shows that environmental regulations have no effect the output of large HFOs. The 
industry hog output declines with an increase in environmental regulations. The market 
share of a representative small or large HFO can either increase or decrease depending on 
the direction of the effect of environmental regulations on the outputs of small and large 
HFOs; and the industry output.  
Long-run results differ significantly from their short-run counterparts. Our prime 
focus is how environmental regulations affect the structure of hog farms in the long-run. 
In contrast to our short-run findings, long-run the effects of environmental regulations on 
the output for each HFO size, the number of HFOs, industry output and the share of hog 23 
 
marketing for each HFO size, are inconclusive. The type of regulation becomes important 
in the determination of the direction of change due to environmental regulations. 
Different types of regulations pose different effects on average costs and marginal costs. 
A regulation that affects fixed costs will in turn affect average costs while it will not have 
any major effect on marginal costs. On the other hand, a regulation that affects variable 
costs will affect both average and marginal costs, although we may not be able to tell 
apriori which one is affected more. Even though we could not readily sign the change in 
the shares of marketing for each HFO size, results do shed light on the variables that 
affect the shares of hog marketing in equilibrium.  
In the long-run, the shares of marketing depend on the change in average and 
marginal costs due to environmental regulations, industry output, changes in average and 
marginal costs due to an increase in output and the number of hog farms. These variables 
provide an important input in empirical analysis. Results on changes in shares of hog 
marketing, the focus of the study, imply that environmental regulations will result in one 
of three possible scenarios: (1) a more competitive industry in which small hog 
operations are not adversely affected which will allow more small operations to enter 
rather than exit the industry; (2) a more concentrated hog industry in which large 
operations survive while small operations exit the industry; (3) no change in the structure 
of the industry where both sizes of operations are not significantly affected by 
environmental stringency. The empirical investigation of the effects of environmental 
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Table 1 compares the stringency of regulations of HFOs at the state-level. A „0‟ indicates 
that the type of regulation is not used at the state level; a „1‟ indicates that the type of 
regulation is enforced at the state-level; and a „2‟ indicates that the regulation is more 
stringent at the state level than the associated federal standard. 
 













































































IA  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  0  1  1  1  2  2  13 
NC  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  2  1  14 29 
 
Source: State websites, 2=extensive regulation enforced, 1=regulation is enforced, 0=regulation is not enforced 
 
 
MN  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  13 
IL  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  1  2  2  14 
NE  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  1  12 
IN  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  0  1  1  1  1  2  13 
MO  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  0  1  1  1  2  1  12 
OK  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  0  1  1  1  2  2  13 
OH  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  0  1  1  1  1  1  12 
KS  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  2  1  13 
FED  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  1  1  1  1  1  9 